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Guns, Butter, and Human Rights – The Congressional Politics of U.S. Aid to Egypt 
 
Abstract: In February 2011, the dramatic ouster of Hosni Mubarak threw into the spotlight the 
U.S. policy of granting comparatively generous and unconditional aid to the Egyptian regime 
at a time when the strategic rationale for such aid had become less obvious and calls for 
inserting human rights considerations into foreign aid allocations more prominent.  
Based on the statistical analysis of an unprecedented set of roll call votes taken in the U.S. 
House of Representatives during the years 2004 to 2007, this paper sheds light on the 
Congressional coalition that shielded Egypt’s pre-revolutionary regime from increased 
Congressional pressure in the years leading up to its eventual demise.  
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Introduction 
In the early days of Egypt’s ‘January 25’ revolution, a number of U.S. politicians 
demonstrated public skepticism about the push for democratic change unfolding in the 
country. Former Vice President Dick Cheney praised Egypt’s long-time ruler Hosni Mubarak 
as ‘a good man, a good friend and ally to the United States (Blood 2011)’ even after his 
regime had relied, once again, on its well-rehearsed violent intimidation tactics in dealing 
with opposition forces in Egypt. Republican Conference Chairman Thaddeaus McCotter (R-
Mich.) focused on the prospect of Islamist rule in his call for America to ‘stand with her ally 
Egypt to preserve an imperfect government capable of reform; and prevent a tyrannical 
government capable of harm’ (2011). Democratic Representative Adam Smith (Wash.), a 
long-time member of the House Armed Services committee, who voted against changing aid 
to Egypt in three of the four votes analyzed here, vigorously defended the need for the 
continued provision of military aid, but acknowledged that past support of human-rights 
abusing governments had been ‘long-term bad strategy’ (quoted in Rogin 2011a).  
All this raises questions about the extent to which these statements are indicative of a broader 
set of determinants that have shaped Congressional views on the roughly $1.5 billion in 
unconditional aid the U.S. has been granting to Egypt every year. In other words, have the 
members of Congress, who share Dick Cheney’s conservatism on economic and foreign 
policy, or Adam Smith’s concerns about U.S. links with the Egyptian military, or McCotter’s 
comparatively large Arab- and Muslim-American constituency, been more likely to oppose 
any change to the U.S. aid package at a time when its underlying rationale had become 
strategically and normatively dubious?  
In an attempt to present one possible answer, the following analysis utilizes a regression 
analysis of four unprecedented Congressional roll call votes on amendments seeking to 
condition, re-arrange or cut U.S. military and economic aid to Egypt from 2004 to 2007. 
Building on the efforts of colleagues who have turned their attention to the domestic 
determinants of U.S. foreign aid allocations (Fleck/Kilby 2006; Milner/Tingley 2010), the 
following analysis sheds light on the coalition of lawmakers who have supported the long-
standing U.S. interest in pre-empting the introduction of human rights concerns into the aid 
relationship with Egypt. This paper thus contributes to the literature on the role of ethnic, 
religious and economic lobbies that try to mold U.S. policies on human rights in general and 
toward the Middle East in particular.  
The next section offers a theoretical justification for the overall research question as well as a 
contextualization of the four roll call votes under consideration. It will set the stage for the 
presentation of the independent variables and hypotheses. This will be followed by the 
discussion of the descriptive and regression analyses of predictors of Congressional voting on 
U.S. aid for Egypt. The conclusion will sum up the paper’s main findings and highlight areas 
that warrant further research.  
The Congressional debate on U.S. Aid for Egypt 
For a long time, U.S. interest in maintaining the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt 
and in keeping Soviet influence in the Arab world at bay constituted two widely accepted 
rationales for the U.S.-Egyptian aid relationship. Since the end of the Cold War, however, 
such strategic justifications have appeared increasingly tenuous. First, the withdrawal of the 
Soviet Union/Russia as a serious challenger to U.S. regional influence meant that the 
Egyptian regime did not enjoy any attractive military-strategic option beyond continued 
alignment with the United States and Israel. This is reflected in the gradual, but consistent rise 
of public skepticism toward Egypt in the United States. From a high water-mark in 1978 
when, in the context of the Israeli-Egyptian rapprochement, 75% of U.S.-Americans saw their 
country as having a vital interest in Egypt, these numbers fell to 45% and 46% in 1994 and 
1998, only to recover to 53% in the first post 9/11-survey in 2002 (CCGA 2002, 63). Second, 
the rise of al-Qaeda and related groups prompted Washington to debate whether its staunch 
support for regimes in Cairo, Rabat and Riyadh might have played a role in making the 
United States a target of radical Islamist agitation and terrorism (Berger 2009a). Third, U.S. 
aid allocations began to reflect a general preparedness to incorporate human rights concerns 
as a criterion of eligibility (Lai 2003).  
The question as to why Congress continued to support outsized aid for Egypt seems even 
more relevant in light of the dramatic revolution that swept Hosni Mubarak’s regime aside in 
February 2011. From a comparative politics perspective, the old regime’s abject human rights 
record and its poor performance on many human development indicators (Foreign Policy 
Failed States Index 2010) were not surprising. Donor decisions to tie foreign aid solely to a 
certain foreign policy behavior irrespective of any domestic political or economic reform have 
been found to ultimately entrench authoritarian rule (Licht 2010; Wright 2009). This is 
because the provision of foreign aid makes it easier for authoritarian leaders to provide private 
goods to the winning coalition in order to increase the loyalty of its members (Bueno de 
Mesquita/Smith 2009a).i Since authoritarian leaders are also reluctant to expand public goods 
– as this could empower opposition actors to challenge the status quo – unconditional foreign 
aid to authoritarian leaders with small winning coalitions perpetuates poverty as well (Bueno 
de Mesquita/Smith 2009b). The set of incentives associated with unconditional foreign aid 
also explains why the old Mubarak regime condoned or even fostered anti-Israeli and anti-
Semitic sentiments and stereotypes (Berger 2009b). A significant increase in Egyptian public 
support for the peace treaty with Israel might have caused the U.S. to reassess the need to 
provide foreign aid at the current levels and thus might have made it more difficult for the 
Egyptian regime to provide private goods to the winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita/Smith 
2009b). Contrary to recent revisionist accounts of the Bush administration’s relationship with 
the Egyptian regime that focus more on rhetoric than substance (Abrams 2011), President 
Bush had followed his Republican and Democratic predecessors in the steadfast support for 
the Egyptian regime and the aid allocation on which it depended (Berger 2011). In fact, even 
in the context of the harsh crackdown on the peaceful Egyptian political reform movement 
that was gathering strength in the second half of the previous decade, the Bush administration 
strongly opposed any Congressional initiative to alter the fundamentals of the U.S. aid 
relationship with Egypt. However, this did not prevent Congressional leaders and committee 
chairmen of both parties from ultimately taking the unprecedented step of letting their 
colleagues publicly record their displeasure by allowing roll call votes on cutting, re-arranging 
or conditioning aid to Egypt. These votes form the basis of the following empirical analysis. 
 
The Votes and their Context 
The first vote to be studied here occurred in June 2004 when California Democrat Tom 
Lantos proposed an amendment that sought to divert $320 million out of roughly $1.2 billion 
in Foreign Military Finance funds to the economic aid account. At this stage, overwhelming 
majorities of both parties were still willing to follow the Bush administration’s call not to 
upset the bilateral relationship at a time when Washington’s diplomats were eager to recruit 
Egyptian support for the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza (table 1). The second vote occurred in 
2005 when Joe Pitts’ (R-Pa.) amendment would have mandated the reallocation of $750 
million from the annual U.S. military aid package for Egypt to USAID’s Child Survival and 
Health Account for fighting such infectious diseases as malaria. With only 87 ‘yeas’, it 
suffered the most lopsided defeat of any of the four roll call votes taken on U.S. aid to Egypt. 
This vote occurred at a time when U.S. diplomatic pressure had forced the Egyptian 
government to announce the first presidential elections in history and the release of liberal 
politician Ayman Nour, a leading critic of Hosni Mubarak’s intention to simply extend his 
reign through another heavily orchestrated national referendum. It also followed outgoing 
U.S. Ambassador David Welch’s announcement that USAID would, for the first time, offer 
grants to Egyptian nongovernmental organizations with explicitly political goals. It was in this 
context of cautious optimism that David Obey (D-Wis.), then-ranking member on the 
Appropriations Committee, was able to insert language into the appropriations bill mandating, 
for the first time, that $100 million of annual economic assistance could only be used for 
democracy and education programs. Obey made clear that he was ‘looking for a way to send a 
clear signal to Egypt that we find their human rights record to be an embarrassment without 
thoroughly upsetting the administration’s ability to continue to negotiate in that region, to try 
to move what is left of the peace process forward (Congressional Record 2005, H5299).’ 
Obey’s initiative effectively doubled the amount the White House had requested and appears 
to have moved a number of lawmakers interested in sending Egypt a message on the issue of 
political reform to oppose Pitts’ more drastic measure. 
The third vote was significant insofar as it was the first time that a partisan gap emerged in 
2006 when David Obey’s attempt to reduce or alter aid to Egypt was only narrowly defeated 
(table 1). His amendment resembled the Pitts amendment of the year before as it also sought 
to transfer portions of U.S. aid to Egypt to aid accounts dealing with other parts of Africa 
(HIV/AIDS and Darfur). It differed insofar as it proposed to only cut economic aid and even 
that to a much smaller degree ($100 million). By 2007, however, Egypt’s position had further 
deteriorated. It suffered from the fact that it was not able to exert the level of influence over 
the various Palestinian factions necessary to stress its strategic importance in the eyes of 
skeptical U.S. lawmakers. In fact, smuggling to the Gaza strip (which undermined Israel’s 
strategic position vis-à-vis Hamas) continued at high levels, while Cairo’s diplomatic efforts 
were overshadowed by the newly confident leadership of Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, the 
ongoing crackdown on peaceful opposition of any political stripe infuriated many long-time 
Congressional supporters of Egypt who felt double-crossed by Cairo’s hollow promises of 
reform. As David Obey explained in 2007, ‘I do believe that we have an obligation to expect 
that countries with whom we are so closely associated will perform within certain norms of 
decency when it comes to the question of human rights (CR 2007, H6914-5).’  
Obey consequently inserted a passage in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 
stipulating that $200 million of foreign military finance funds for Egypt (roughly one-sixth of 
total such outlays) should not be made available  
unless the Secretary of State certifies and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that 
the Government of Egypt has taken concrete and measurable steps to (1) adopt and 
implement judicial reforms that protect the independence of the judiciary; (2) review 
criminal procedures and train police leadership in modern policing to curb police abuses; 
and (3) detect and destroy the smuggling network and tunnels that lead from Egypt to 
Gaza (CR 2007, H6913).  
 
This stipulation was the target of an amendment offered by Charles Boustany (R-La.) that 
tried to strike it from the final version of the bill. The fact that Egypt’s positive impact on 
Israel’s national security seemed to have diminished and the inclusion of language allowing 
President Bush to make use of a ‘national security waiver’ soon after the vote explains why 
18 Democrats and 48 Republicans, who had consistently voted against altering or cutting U.S. 
aid to Egypt from 2004 to 2006, now declined to support Boustany’s amendment. Though 
largely of symbolic nature, this fourth roll call vote was historic insofar as Congress, for the 
first time, voted to condition aid to Egypt. It thus marked the culmination of a long process of 
increasing Congressional exasperation with an allied regime that remained stubbornly 
resistant to genuine political change until an unprecedented public upheaval forced it from 
power in February 2011. 
 
Data and Method 
Dependent Variable 
This analysis focuses on the four, and so far only, post-Cold War roll call votes aimed at 
cutting, rearranging or simply conditioning the composition of annual aid to Egypt the United 
States provides through the Economic Support Fund and Foreign Military Finance programs 
(FMF) (table 1). A vote in favor of altering U.S. aid was coded as ‘1’ while ‘nays’ were coded 
as ‘0’. The following models represent results from logistic regression analyses of this 
binomial dependent variable in each of the four roll call votes over the course of four years 
and three Congressional sessions (108th to 110th). 
 
Independent Variables 
There are a number of variables which might determine how members of Congress vote on 
the issues involved in the U.S.-Egyptian aid relationship. Egypt’s strategic value for 
Washington’s policy makers depends to a large extent on its triangular relationship with the 
United States and Israel (Quandt 1990). Factors which determine roll call votes on the Arab-
Israeli conflict can thus be expected to play a critical role either because some members of 
Congress were disillusioned with the Egyptian inability or unwillingness to be more 
supportive of U.S. and Israeli positions or because they remained convinced of the need for 
continued Egyptian diplomatic and intelligence involvement.  
At the elite level, the religious faith of individual members has received close consideration in 
the context of the noticeable tendency among Evangelical lawmakers to join their Jewish 
colleagues in sponsoring and supporting legislation deemed as pro-Israel 
(Oldmixon/Rosenson/Wald 2005). Evangelical concerns about the suppression of (religious) 
freedoms (Croft 2007) have found an early expression in the Freedom from Religious 
Prosecution Act, which a Republican controlled Congress enacted notwithstanding the 
Clinton administration’s trepidation (Holmes 1997). The ongoing violence and institutional 
challenges (Tadros 2009) its substantial Coptic minority faces have ensured that Egypt has 
remained in the focus of Evangelical criticism. In order to test whether any of these concerns 
influenced Congressional voting on foreign aid to Egypt, the following models will include 
dummy variables for Jewish and Evangelical members with all others as the omitted category.  
While African-American political elites have similarly demonstrated great interest in human 
rights issues globally, they have tended to identify less with Israelis and more with the 
Palestinians for whom Egypt is an important diplomatic partner (Miller 2002; 
Oldmixon/Rosenson/Wald 2005). Members of the Congressional Black Caucus could 
therefore be expected to be more likely to reject attempts to cut aid to Egypt. However, two of 
the amendments would have reallocated funds to support humanitarian efforts in Africa, 
where members of the Congressional Black Caucus have frequently cooperated with 
Evangelical colleagues to shape U.S. policies (Heinze 2007). The following models will 
therefore include a dummy variable that allows the comparison of African-American 
lawmakers (‘1’) with their colleagues (‘0’). 
Hypothesis Ia therefore is that Jewish and Evangelical members of Congress are likely to 
challenge U.S. aid to Egypt when this is seen as safeguarding Israeli security interests. 
 Hypothesis Ib African-American members of Congress are less likely to challenge U.S. aid 
to Egypt unless such changes benefit other parts of Africa.   
When assessing the possible impact of elite-level factors, it seems necessary to control for the 
effects of partisan considerations. As mentioned above, the Bush administration was 
consistent in opposing all four attempts to change the U.S. aid relationship with Egypt. This 
lack of variability makes the public stance of the Bush administration redundant as a possible 
variable. At the same time, however, the examples of Republican skepticism quoted at the 
beginning suggest that ideology might constitute an elite level factor shaping views on U.S. 
aid to Egypt. Some authors point out that measures of ideology based on patterns of 
Congressional voting such as Pool and Rosenthal’s DW-Nominate scores should be treated 
with caution since it can be assumed that they themselves already reflect constituency 
interests (Fleck and Kilby 2006; Fordham/McKeown 2003). Milner and Tingley (2010) 
found, for instance, that support for foreign aid is mostly determined by the economic 
characteristics of a Congressional district and the ideologies of its constituents. At the same 
time, the partisan differences that emerged in the 2006 and 2007 roll call votes (table 1) when 
Democrats were thirteen and six times more likely to vote for conditioning or cutting aid to 
Egypt than Republicans mean that omitting this control could potentially result in variables 
reaching significance that only reflect well-known differences between the two parties in 
terms of campaign contributions and constituency profile.ii The following analysis will thus 
employ an additional model for each vote that includes ideology as measured in Poole and 
Rosenthal’s DW-Nominate scores which, in their first dimension, indicate a representative’s 
view of the appropriate level of government intervention in the economy (Poole/Rosenthal 
2000).  
In addition, foreign aid votes might not always attract attention from many voters as they do 
not perceive their interests as affected (Irwin 2000). The decision to introduce human rights 
concerns into the debate on foreign aid to Egypt is therefore not comparable to the votes on 
the ‘high-focus economic aid’ with broad domestic repercussions that Milner and Tingley 
(2010) studied, or the votes on international financial rescues analyzed by Broz (2005). 
Instead, the votes studied below might also reflect a lawmaker’s general belief in whether 
normative considerations should guide U.S. foreign policy. Rathbun’s (2007) analysis of data 
gathered in Holsti and Rosenau’s 1996 survey of U.S. foreign policy elites showed, for 
instance, that elites who express particular concern about such community values as public 
health and the environment are also more likely to support foreign aid and human rights. 
Since the immediate distributional effects of conditioning or cutting aid to Egypt were rather 
limited in at least two of the votes considered here, alternative measures of legislator ideology 
might serve as equally or even more robust predictors. The National Journal offers one such 
measure for all lawmakers taking part in at least half of the ‘key’ roll call votes throughout a 
particular Congressional session. Ranging from 0 to 100, the National Journal’s foreign 
policy-conservatism score indicates how often an individual representative voted more 
conservatively than others on issues such as withdrawal from Iraq, paying dues to the United 
Nations, and free trade agreements (see National Journal 2007 for full details on ranking 
methodology). The inclusion of this measure of ideology will test whether, in line with 
Rathbun’s earlier finding concerning the broader U.S. foreign policy elite, Congressional 
liberals have been more likely to support changes to the aid relationship with Egypt. 
Hypothesis II therefore is that members of Congress with a more liberal voting record on 
either economic or foreign policy issues are more likely to challenge the status quo in U.S. aid 
for Egypt. 
At the same time, representatives interested in reelection need to take into account the 
interests of ethnic and religious constituencies who tend to mobilize on issues as contentious 
as Middle East politics. Oldmixon, Rosenson, and Wald (2005), for instance, linked the share 
of Jewish Americans among a lawmaker’s constituency with greater support for what they see 
as a pro-Israeli stance on Capitol Hill. To test whether this factor also helps determine votes 
on U.S. aid to Egypt, this analysis uses Milner and Tingley’s (2010) data on the share of 
African Americans, Jewish Americans and Evangelical Christians within each Congressional 
district.iii 
In addition, the following analysis features variables reflecting the percentage of Muslim 
Americans in a given constituency. Their presence has already been shown to be of 
importance in shaping legislative decisions (Martin 2009).iv In one of the first quantitative 
attempts to assess their influence, the share of Arab Americans will also be included in 
separate models.v Data on the number of Arab Americans per Congressional district was 
taken from the 2006-2008 American Community Survey three-year estimates (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2008).vi This increasingly important voting bloc might become involved over the 
specific Middle Eastern political context of the proposals to change aid to Egypt. 
Representatives of the pro-Arab lobby, for instance, have portrayed the ‘new and recycled 
allegations’ over human rights and anti-Semitism against Egypt and Saudi Arabia as an 
attempt to weaken both countries’ standing in the United States and make it more difficult for 
them to push Washington toward more active Middle East diplomacy (Dumke 2006, 91-92). 
The Arab-American Institute (AAI) - set up by James Zogby as an instrument to get Arab 
Americans involved in the political process (Nimer 2003) - used a vote in favor of Boustany’s 
2007 motion as an indication of pro-Arab views when constructing its annual Congressional 
scorecard. In late 2010, lobbying by Tony Podesta, former Republican Representative Robert 
Livingston and former Democratic Representative Toby Moffett successfully persuaded the 
U.S. Senate against passing Resolution 586 introduced by John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Russ 
Feingold (D-Wis.). In the process, Moffett had declared that this resolution, which called on 
the Egyptian regime to end arbitrary arrest and ensure that the presidential and parliamentary 
elections scheduled for 2011 would be ‘free, transparent and credible’ would be viewed as an 
‘insult’ by ‘an important ally’ (Lichtblau 2011). The inclusion of data on the share of Arab 
and Muslim Americans among a Congressional district’s population will thus help determine 
to what extent such interpretations were shared by the wider Arab and Muslim American 
communities and those representing them. 
Hypothesis IIIa therefore is that in instances where there is a clear link to the conflict 
between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the presence of substantial Jewish and Evangelical 
constituencies will make members of Congress more likely to condition aid to Egypt. 
Hypothesis IIIb is that U.S. representatives from districts with a substantial share of Arab-, 
Muslim- and African-American constituencies will oppose such efforts. 
Previous studies reported campaign contributions as having only a limited impact 
(Ansolabehere/de Fiueiredo/Snyder 2003; Fleisher 1993). The U.S.-Egyptian aid relationship 
poses a particularly strong test of this assumption because it directly touches the interests of 
four of the best organized U.S. lobbies. The following models will make use of data available 
from the Center for Responsive Politics on the share of the total campaign contributions each 
representative received in the election cycle preceding the vote from the pro-Israel lobby as 
well as the agriculture, oil and defense lobbies. Contributions from the agriculture, oil and 
defense industries were included in the analysis because agriculture (29%), oil (10%) and 
defense (10%) products made up a substantial portion of the total volume of U.S. exports to 
Egypt of $23.7 billion from 2005 to 2009 (U.S. Census Bureau 2009). Reflecting a historical 
pattern of successful attempts to use foreign and food aid as indirect subsidies for U.S. 
agricultural products (Winders 2004), Egypt has consistently ranked among the Top Ten 
export markets for U.S. agricultural products (USDA 2010). The annual U.S. military aid 
package of roughly $1.3 billion served the interests of a core pillar of the authoritarian regime 
of Hosni Mubarak by covering between one-third and one-half of Egypt’s annual defense 
expenditures as well as 80% of all procurement costs for new military hardware (GAO 2006; 
Clarke 1997). Without such aid, a poor country such as Egypt, with a per capita GDP of 
$6,000 in 2009, could not have afforded to be the United States’ second most important 
customer of military hardware after Saudi Arabia, purchasing 9.8% of all U.S. arms exports 
from 1999 to 2008 (DSCA 2008). As these numbers illustrate, U.S. military aid to Egypt has 
important domestic implications because it constitutes a crucial subsidy for the U.S. defense 
industry.vii As a U.S. newspaper account points out, this allowed Egyptians to curry political 
favor with representatives from a diverse set of Congressional districts by buying ‘tanks from 
Sterling Heights, Mich. (…); high-speed boats from Gulfport, Miss., Hellfire missiles from 
Orlando, Fla.; and Black Hawk helicopters from Stratford, Conn (Stockman 2011).’viii The 
relative importance of the Egyptian market has thus provided the regime of Hosni Mubarak 
with very effective leverage against attempts to change the way the United States grants aid or 
simply to prevent the discussion of politically sensitive issues. While the circumstances and 
implications of specific amendments differ, the overall effects can be expected to be uniform 
for the oil, defense and agriculture lobbies across all models because reallocations, cuts and 
conditionality are all similar in their negative effects on their economic interests. 
Hypothesis IVa thus is that lawmakers who receive a higher share of their campaign 
contributions from the oil, defense and agriculture lobbies are more hesitant to change the 
status quo in the U.S.-Egyptian aid relationship. 
Hypothesis IVb is that lawmakers who receive a higher share of their campaign contributions 
from the pro-Israel lobby are more likely to support such changes in cases where there is a 
clear link to the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors. 
 
Analysis 
Descriptive Analysis 
The results reported in table 1 offer only modest support for hypotheses Ia and Ib. In 2005, the 
odds of Evangelical members of Congress voting for the Pitts amendment were 2.30 times 
higher than for their colleagues. In 2006 and 2007, this pattern was reversed. The emergence 
of partisan and ideological differences in these latter votes explains to some extent why the 
odds of economically conservative Evangelicals voting in favor of cutting aid were now 
significantly lower than for their colleagues (table 2). With the exception of 2005, Jewish 
members of Congress voted overwhelmingly, in 2006 even unanimously, in favor of changing 
the U.S. aid relationship with Egypt. But only in two cases did their voting pattern diverge 
significantly from their colleagues. African-American lawmakers set themselves apart only in 
2006 when they proved significantly more enthusiastic about redirecting aid from Egypt to 
other parts of the African continent. 
The results of Mann-Whitney independent samples tests summarized in tables 3a-d point to a 
potentially more robust empirical support for hypotheses II, III and IV.ix In 2004, 
Congressional supporters of moving military to economic aid differed significantly in their 
greater reliance on contributions from the pro-Israel lobby, their lower reliance on 
contributions from the defense industry lobby, the lower number of Evangelicals and the 
higher number of Jewish Americans in their districts (table 3a). Amongst Republicans, 
supporters and opponents of the Lantos amendment differed only in the relative distribution of 
African-American constituents. Interestingly, among Democrats this pattern was also 
significant but reversed. The almost significant overall difference in terms of contributions 
from the oil lobby is mirrored in a similar split within the Democratic caucus. On all other 
dimensions, differences within the Democratic Party fell in line with the pattern observable in 
the House as a whole. 
In 2005, supporters of the Pitts amendment differed in their significantly greater conservatism 
as well as the smaller share of Arab and Muslim Americans among their constituents overall 
and among Republicans (table 3b). Interestingly, the National Journal’s foreign policy voting 
index as the second measure of ideology did not play a role at all. Among Democrats, the 
relative reliance on contributions from the defense lobby emerged as the only significant 
difference. 
In 2006, Obey’s supporters, in general and within the Democratic Party, differed significantly 
in their greater liberalism on economic and foreign policy issues, their greater reliance on pro-
Israel contributions, their lower reliance on defense industry contributions, the lower number 
of Evangelicals among their constituents and the higher number of Jewish and Arab 
Americans. Among Republicans, Obey’s supporters received significantly lower contributions 
from the agriculture industry and significantly higher contributions from the pro-Israel lobby 
and scored significantly lower on the National Journal foreign policy-conservatism index. 
Differences in the relative share of African-American and Muslim-American constituents as 
well as oil contributions appear to be linked to the partisan nature of the roll call vote. 
In 2007, differences in terms of economic and foreign policy conservatism, defense and oil 
contributions, and the share of Evangelical and Jewish constituents appear linked to the 
partisan nature of the vote. Among Republicans, the supporters of Charles Boustany’s failed 
attempt to strike language conditioning $100 million of military aid to Egypt on political 
reform differed through their greater reliance on contributions from the agriculture lobby. 
Among Democrats, they set themselves apart by lower contributions from the pro-Israel lobby 
as well as the greater share of African and Muslim Americans among their constituents. 
With variables emerging as significant at all levels in differentiating supporters and opponents 
of altering long-standing practices in the U.S.-Egyptian aid relationship, the following 
regression analysis will establish which variables acted as robust predictors of the four roll 
call votes under consideration and shed light on the relative predictive power of elite- and 
constituency-level variables. 
 
Regression Analysis 
Tables 4 through 7 illustrate that, if controlled for the impact of campaign contributions from 
various lobbies and the demographic profile of constituencies, the statistical significance of 
the voting patterns of Jewish- and African-American members of Congress observed in the 
preceding descriptive analysis vanishes.x The 2006 vote constitutes an exception insofar as the 
variable for African-American members remains not only significant, but also changes its sign 
from positive to negative in the models that control for ideology. This seems particularly 
striking in light of the strong support usually offered by African-American lawmakers for 
such aid (Uscinski/Rocca/Sanchez/Brenden 2009) and the initial descriptive analysis which 
showed African-American members as more likely to vote in favor of Obey’s amendment in 
2006 (table 2). This raises the question as to whether there are statistically significant 
differences observable in the constituency profile and campaign contributions among the 10 
members of the Congressional Black caucus who voted against their own party and their 30 
African-American colleagues who supported the diversion of $100 million in aid to Egypt to 
the accounts for Darfur and the Department of State’s Global HIV/AIDS initiative. A Mann-
Whitney test revealed that, in terms of Jewish-American constituents, the difference between 
African-American supporters of the Obey amendment (Median = 4.3%) and its African-
American opponents (1.0%) almost reached significance (U = 88.500, z = -1.922, p <.1, r = -
.30). Even more importantly, in terms of the relative size of their African-American 
constituents, there was a statistically significant difference between African-American 
representatives who voted in favor of the 2006 Obey amendment (Median = 56.7%) and those 
who opposed it (43.6%; U = 84.000; z = -2.061; p < .05; r = -.33). In light of the expected or 
demonstrated interests of their voters, the overwhelming majority of the Congressional Black 
Caucus followed the lead of Danny Davis (D-Ill.) and Al Green (D-Tex.) who had only been 
arrested two days before the vote while protesting in front of the Sudanese embassy in 
Washington, D.C. According to Green, opponents of the Obey amendment would have to ask 
themselves: ‘Where were you when there was murder and rape and hunger in Darfur? Where 
were you when your brothers and your sisters were suffering? (CR 2006, H3546).’ The 2006 
vote thus provides an intriguing example of how political leaders can increase the chances of 
legislative success by making proposed legislation attractive to the overlapping interests of 
different constituencies.xi 
The 2005 vote was the only vote where an elite-level variable was robust to various model 
specifications. Having long been concerned about poverty in Africa (Hearn 2002; Huliaras 
2008), Evangelical lawmakers were attracted to Pitts’ appeal to redirect aid from an ‘ally like 
Egypt that refuses to make the necessary political, democratic and human rights reforms’ to 
protecting the poor and vulnerable from infectious diseases (CR 2005, H5298). In 2006, the 
impact of Evangelical faith becomes insignificant in the models that control for ideology. This 
reflects the fact, that during the respective Congressional session, Evangelical members of 
Congress (Median = .452) were significantly more conservative than their non-Evangelical 
colleagues (Median = -.188, U = 6484.00, z = -7,536, p < .001, r = -.36). 
2005 also constituted a special case in terms of the impact of ideology as it was the only vote 
in the four where economic conservatism was significantly associated with greater support for 
cuts to the aid allocation for Egypt. This was not simply a reflection of a partisan split, which, 
as table 1 illustrates, did not occur, but of a split within the Republican conference, which saw 
supporters of the Pitts amendment as significantly more conservative than its opponents in 
terms of economic issues (table 3b; U=2255.00, z = -5.38, p <.001, r =-.36). Interestingly, the 
alternative measure of foreign policy conservatism as calculated by the National Journal was 
insignificant.  
The significance of economic and foreign policy conservatism in the last two votes is not 
surprising given the emergence of partisan differences (see table 1). At least, in 2006, this was 
not simply the result of a partisan split (table 3c). The 46 Democrats who opposed Obey’s 
2006 amendment differed in their greater conservatism on economic issues (Median = -0.336) 
from their more liberal Democratic colleagues (Median = -0.411, U = 2734.00, z = -2.292, p 
<.05, r = -.16). This effect was even stronger in terms of the National Journal’s foreign policy 
ranking. Not only were the 46 Democrats who voted with the Republican majority equally 
more conservative (Median = 31) than Obey’s supporters (Median = 20, z = -3.741, p < .001, 
r = -.27). Obey’s Republican supporters were also significantly more liberal in their foreign 
policy voting patterns (Median = 59) than his Republican opponents (Median = 73, z = -
6.046, p = <.001, r = -.40). This finding might reflect the fact that constituents in districts that 
tend to elect liberal representatives also share greater cosmopolitan awareness of and 
sensitivity to human suffering in other parts of the world (Fordham 2008b). It also marks the 
convergence within the Democratic caucus on the need to push Egypt much harder on the 
issue of political reform. It was no coincidence that David Obey and Nita Lowey, two long-
time stalwarts of the U.S.-Egyptian aid relationship on the Appropriations Committee, would 
plead the case for change. In 2006, Obey described his successful attempt to forestall Pitts’ 
much more strident proposal the year before as an attempt to give ‘notice to the Egyptian 
government that my patience, and the patience of the American people, was wearing thin’ 
(CR 2006, H3538). Lowey added, ‘We, as members of this committee, delivered those 
messages in person. We understand that Egypt is a close, essential, strategic ally which is 
precisely why we tried to deliver those messages quietly, in private. It did not work. (...) The 
pictures on CNN when we were even in Egypt kept appearing (CR 2006, H3542).’ Instead, as 
Obey noted, emergency laws had been extended yet again; the liberal reform candidate of the 
2005 presidential election, Ayman Nour, had been sent to prison in a trial widely regarded as 
politically motivated; municipal elections had been postponed; peaceful protestors arrested 
and beaten; and, in the week before that debate, the work of the International Republican 
Institute had been suspended after its country director had criticized the pace of reform (CR 
2006, H3537 and H3542). The powerful example of Obey’s and Lowey’s conversion from 
opponents to supporters of conditioning aid to Egypt explains why the 54 Democrats who had 
voted against the Lantos and Pitts amendments in 2004 and 2005 would now leave their 
previous hesitation behind and support Obey in 2006 and 2007. 
Overall, campaign contributions from lobbies with interests at stake in the U.S.-Egyptian 
relationship emerged as the most consistent type of predictor with relevance in three out of 
four roll call votes on U.S. aid to Egypt. Particularly noticeable was the impact of 
contributions from the defense lobby. In 2004, a higher share of defense contributions was a 
robust predictor of greater reluctance to support reallocating $325 million of military aid to 
the account for economic aid. Bill Young (R-Fl), then chairman of the Appropriations 
Committee, was straightforward in expressing the concerns of those members of Congress 
who were particularly reliant on contributions from the defense lobby. With 19.6% of his 
campaign contributions in the previous election cycle coming from the defense lobby (ranking 
fifth overall), Young quoted a letter from Secretary of State Colin Powell who warned that the 
reduction in military assistance under consideration could lead to the cancellation of almost 
$2.2 billion in total contract value (CR 2004, H5848). Roger Wicker (R-Miss.), who ranked 
30th in terms of the relative size of defense lobby contributions, highlighted Egypt’s pragmatic 
approach in allowing the passage of U.S. nuclear warships through the Suez Canal and in 
granting over-flight rights for U.S. aircraft: ‘We do foreign assistance for altruistic reasons, 
certainly for humanitarian reasons, of course. But the main reason we do foreign assistance is 
we do it in the American national interest’ (CR 2006, H3539-40).xii Brian Baird (D-Wash.), 
who enjoyed defense lobby contributions that put him among the top third among Democrats, 
played down the regime’s violence against peaceful protesters: ‘Yes, there are concerns. But 
goodness gracious, could you not turn on the TV occasionally and see demonstrators clashing 
with police in our own country? And do we not have other allies in that country and elsewhere 
on this planet that have treated journalists harshly? (CR 2006, H3545).’ David Price (D-N.C.) 
whose dependence on defense lobby contributions was almost twice the party’s median (0.8% 
versus 0.48%) presented a similarly ‘Realist’ argument when he asserted that the Egyptian 
intelligence service’s mediation efforts under the leadership of General Omar Suleiman in 
Gaza were becoming even more important in the aftermath of Hamas’ election victory in 
early 2006 (CR 2006, H3540).xiii  
Such appeals to Egypt’s service in the U.S. and Israeli national interests explain why 
contributions from the pro-Israel lobby failed to reach significance in three out of four votes. 
They reflected disagreements on whether cuts to U.S. aid to Egypt truly serve U.S. and Israel 
interests. In 2004, Republican Jim Kolbe (R.-Ariz.), then-chairman of the Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and ranking fourth in terms of the relative size of pro-
Israel lobby contributions (7.1% of overall campaign contributions), directly quoted from the 
aforementioned letter sent by Secretary Powell who claimed that ‘(o)ur credibility in this 
relationship depends to a great degree upon being a reliable provider of assistance to the 
Egyptian military’ (CR 2004, H5851). Before emerging as a leading voice of conditionality in 
2006 and 2007, Nita Lowey (D-N.Y.), ranking member on the Appropriations Subcommittee 
on Foreign Operations and ranking 19th in terms of pro-Israel contributions in 2004 (3.6% of 
overall contributions), argued that U.S. relations with Egypt should not be subjected to 
unnecessary provocations at a time when Cairo had promised to play an important role in the 
Gaza withdrawal, which Ariel Sharon’s government had officially adopted only one month 
before the vote (CR 2004, H5847). 
Hamas’s rise to power, and the subsequent importance of Egypt’s efforts regarding the control 
the border between Israel and Gaza, explains why campaign donations from the pro-Israel 
lobby ultimately became significant in the 2007 vote (table 7). Representatives Lantos 
(ranking 10th in terms of pro-Israel lobby contributions in 2007, 5.0% of overall contributions) 
and Lowey (ranking 21st in 2007, 2.9% of overall contributions) aired their frustrations over 
Egypt’s perceived failure on the Gaza issue. Tom Lantos declared the ‘nightmare’ unfolding 
after the Hamas takeover to be ‘in no small measure, the responsibility of the Government of 
Egypt’ (CR 2007, H6914).  
Unlike previous years, the negative impact of contributions from the oil lobby on support for 
aid conditionality was robust to the addition of a control for lawmaker ideology in 2007. It 
thus seemed rather appropriate that the effort to strike language conditioning aid was led by 
Charles Boustany, who had received the 29th largest share of oil lobby contributions in the 
preceding election cycle. Like all other supporters of unconditional U.S. aid to Egypt, he 
alluded to Egypt’s important regional role since Camp David (CR 2007, H6913). 
The impact of constituency-level variables remained comparatively limited. Only in 2004 did 
such variables play a role robust to various model specifications. Reflecting the significance 
of the corresponding variable in predicting the 2004 vote, Republican Joe Knollenberg and 
Democrat John Dingell (both Mich.), who represented the third and fifth most populous Arab-
American constituencies in relative terms, rose in opposition to the Lantos amendment and 
recalled the legacy of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty (CR 2004, H5849 and H5851). In the 
case of Joe Knollenberg, the perceived interests of the Arab American votes were all the more 
important due to his consistently slim margins of victory in the marginal 9th Congressional 
district. The 2004 models thus suggest that Arab Americans, insofar as they became 
politically involved, understood the Lantos amendment as punishment for Egypt’s criticism of 
Israeli policies toward the Palestinians in the wake of the so-called al-Aqsa intifada.  
The almost significant impact of Jewish-American constituents in 2004 found expression in 
statements by prominent members of the House Committee on International Relations. Gary 
Ackerman, then-ranking member on the International Relations Subcommittee on the Middle 
East and Central Asia (ranking 16th overall with Jewish Americans representing 11.7% of his 
constituency), expressed his concerns about Egypt’s U.S.-financed military upgrade (CR 
2004, H5847). Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fl.), Republican chairwoman of the International 
Relations subcommittee on the Middle East and ranking 12th among Republicans in terms of 
Jewish constituents (4.9% versus party median of 0.44%), expressed her sadness about an  
Egyptian society (that) is suffering from illiteracy, decreasing per capita income, and 
is clamoring for the right to exert their fundamental freedoms and civil liberties, while 
the Egyptian government has embarked on a significant military buildup of the sort 
one would expect from a nation under imminent threat (CR 2004, H5848-9). 
 
Ultimately, she described Egypt as a test case for the ‘freedom agenda’ which President Bush 
had only launched in earnest with his November 2003 speech at the National Endowment for 
Democracy. 
The overall influence of Muslim-American constituents was limited to explaining why, in 
2007, five African-American lawmakers – Democrats Meeks (N.Y.), Jackson-Lee (Tex.), 
Kilpatrick (Mich.), Clarke (N.Y.), Lee (Calif.) - again broke ranks with the rest of the 
Congressional Black Caucus. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test showed that the opponents of 
conditioning aid to Egypt differed significantly in the higher share of Muslim Americans in 
their districts (D(36) = .67, p <.05; Median 2.25 versus 0.86%), with Arab Americans 
narrowly missing conventional levels of significance (D(36) = .57, p <.10: Median 0.66 
versus 0.35%). In 2006, Carolyn Kilpatrick, who ranked 17th overall in terms of Muslim-
American constituents and 33rd in terms of Arab Americans, had portrayed the continuing 
support for Egypt in the context of the need to respect other cultures and religions (CR 2006, 
H3540). During the same debate, Jackson-Lee, ranking 45th in terms of Muslim-American 
constituents (1.4%), ridiculed criticism of the trial of Ayman Nour (CR 2006, H3543). In 
2007, Keith Ellison (D-Minn.), the first Muslim American elected to Congress, warned of ‘a 
very hostile and unhealthy message’ (CR 2007, H6914). The continuing resistance of these 
five lawmakers to joining their Democratic colleagues in cutting or conditioning aid to Egypt 
on human rights grounds thus constitutes evidence that at least on a subordinate, intra-party 
level, the presence of Muslim Americans exerted an influence.  
 
Conclusion 
This analysis has not only highlighted the evolution of Congressional thinking about the U.S. 
aid relationship with Egypt leading up to the revolutionary developments of early 2011. It also 
offered new insights into the shape of the coalition that had, for a long time, maintained one 
of the most prominent items in the annual U.S. foreign aid budget. The intransigence of 
Egypt’s old regime encouraged a sizeable number of Congressional lawmakers to move 
beyond long-held views of U.S. Middle East policies and reassess the fundamentals of U.S.-
Egyptian relations. From 2006 onwards, a coalition of liberal members disillusioned with 
Egypt’s deteriorating human rights record and members who were particularly concerned 
about Israel’s security pushed for the introduction of conditionality into the annual foreign aid 
allocation for Egypt which successive U.S. governments had opposed. The Congressional 
debate about Egypt during the second term of the previous decade thus reflected the 
convergence of interests of those who wanted to prompt a change in Egyptian foreign and 
domestic policies. As became evident in early 2011, the support for an orderly and long-term 
move toward genuine political reform was much easier to align with support for Israel’s 
(perceived) security needs than the momentous and unpredictable nature of revolutionary 
change in wake of the collapse of the Mubarak regime. Malcolm Hoenlein, executive vice 
chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, stressed 
that ‘(w)e've always supported the movement toward democratization. At the same time, you 
don't want to see upheaval that could be exploited by extremist elements in the region. We 
would be very concerned that elements would come into power that would not sustain the 
involvement of Egypt in the peace process and sustain the commitments in the peace 
agreements (cited in Elliott 2011).’  
In its successful effort to shield the regime of Hosni Mubarak from the effects of serious 
human rights conditionality, the Bush administration could rely on those representatives that 
were particularly sympathetic to the interests of the U.S. defense and oil industries. At the 
same time, conservative ideology emerged as a more robust and significant predictor of 
foreign policy decisions of individual lawmakers in three of the four votes. This lends further 
support to Rathbun’s observation that an individual’s support for economic and social 
inequality at home is linked to greater acceptance of and support for a hierarchical order 
abroad where U.S. interests trump those of others (2007).  
Finally, this analysis offered some evidence for the emerging clout of Muslim- and Arab- 
American political activism. While the influence of Muslim Americans was noticeable mostly 
with regard to some otherwise very liberal African-American members of the Democratic 
caucus, Arab-American presence helped predict a Congressional vote on U.S. aid to Egypt in 
at least one instance. At the moment, the policy preferences of Arab and Muslim Americans 
are not always fed into the political process due to their geographic distribution. This is 
because, in many cases, they share culturally diverse districts with long-established and well-
organized Jewish communities that have traditionally helped elect Jewish members of 
Congress. In fact, during the three Congressional sessions studied here, eight (four) 
lawmakers representing the thirty most populous Arab- (Muslim-) American communities in 
relative size were Jewish. The question further research will have to answer is whether the 
(limited) influence of Arab- and Muslim-American constituencies on the side of those 
opposing conditioning aid to Egypt was due to their unease about measures which some 
viewed solely in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict or whether this reflected a general 
inclination to shield Muslim majority and Arab nations from foreign pressure in whatever 
form even if that entailed issues such as human rights. In light of literature (Kull/Ramsay 
2000) demonstrating that, at least on foreign policy issues, U.S. representatives tend to 
mistake the views of an outspoken minority for those of the broader majority, further research 
is needed to confirm to what extent the activities of those Washington lobbyists who 
depend(ed) on the generous financial support from Arab regimes (Eggen 2011) have truly 
represented the political sentiments of the broader Arab and Muslim communities in the 
United States. Given the (in all likelihood) increasing political clout of Arab and Muslim 
Americans, this question warrants closer attention in further studies of U.S. policies toward 
the emerging new Middle East. 
Table 1 – Roll Call Votes on U.S. Foreign Aid to Egypt 
 
Amendment 
sponsor 
Year Objective Roll call 
 
 
Tom Lantos (D-
CA) 
2004 Shift $325 million of FMF to 
ESF account 
131 - 287 
68 D – 131 D 
63 R – 156 R  
Chi square: 1.415 
Odds ratio: NA 
Joe Pitts (R-PA) 2005 Reallocate $750 million of 
FMF to fight malaria in 
Africa 
87 – 326 
34 D – 158 D 
53 R – 168 R 
Chi square: 2.592 
Odds ratio: NA 
David Obey (D-
WI) 
2006 Reallocate $100 million of 
ESF to support fight against 
HIV/AIDS and humanitarian 
efforts in Darfur 
198 – 225 
153 D – 46 D 
45 R – 179 R 
 
Chi square: 
136.53*** 
Odds ratio: 13.23 
Charles Boustany 
(R-LA) 
2007 Strike language conditioning 
$200 million of FMF on 
political reform and end of 
Gaza smuggling 
74 - 343 
15 D - 207 D 
59 R - 136 R 
 
Chi square: 
40.235*** 
Odds ratio: 5.99 
 
Table 2 – Elite-Level Differences in Roll Call Votes on U.S. Foreign Aid to Egypt  
 
 2004  2005  2006  2007  
 Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Evangelicals 25 
(31.6) 
54 
(68.4) 
26 
(33.8) 
51 
(66.2) 
18 
(23.1) 
60 
(76.9) 
59 
(73.8) 
21 
(26.2) 
Other 106 
(31.3) 
233 
(68.7) 
61 
(18.2) 
275 
(81.8) 
180 
(52.2) 
165 
(47.8) 
284 
(84.0) 
54 
(16.0) 
Chi-Square .004 NS 9.182**  21.632***  4.637*  
Odds ratio NA  2.30  0.275  0.534  
         
Jewish 
Americans 
15 
(62.5) 
9 
(37.5) 
7 
(28.0) 
18 
(72.0) 
25 
(100) 
0 
(0) 
26 
(92.9) 
2 
(7.1) 
Other 116 
(29.4) 
278 
(70.6) 
80 
(20.6) 
308 
(79.4) 
173 
(43.5) 
225 
(56.5) 
317 
(81.3) 
73 
(18.7) 
Chi-Square 11.489**  .770 NS 30.194***  2.377 NS 
Odds ratio 3.99  NA  NA  NA  
         
African 
Americans 
7 
(21.9) 
25 
(78.1) 
6 
(15.4) 
33 
(84.6) 
30 
(75.0) 
10 
(25.0) 
33 
(86.8) 
5 
(13.2) 
Other 124 
(32.1) 
262 
(67.9) 
81 
(21.7) 
293 
(78.3) 
168 
(43.9) 
215 
(56.1) 
310 
(81.6) 
70 
(18.4) 
Chi-Square 1.443 NS .836 NS 14.102***  .650 NS 
Odds ratio NA  NA  3.84  NA  
Note: Number in brackets indicate percentage share. *** p <.001, **, p <.01, *, p <.05, § <.1. 
 
Table 3a – Independent Samples Tests for Campaign Contributions and Constituency Profiles 
– 2004 Vote (median) 
 Both Parties Democrats Republicans 
 Ayes – Nays Ayes - Nays Ayes – Nays 
DW Nominate -.146 ó .232 -.413 ó -.362 .450 ó .421 
NJ Foreign Policy conservatism 44 ó 50 24 ó 23 68 ó 68 
Agriculture contributions 0.40 ó 0.47 0.36 ó 0.38 0.48 ó 0.52 
Oil contributions 0.61 ó 0.80§ 0.27 ó 0.41§ 1.37 ó 1.12 
Israel contributions 0 ó 0* 0.32 ó 0§ 0 ó 0 
Defense contributions 0.39 ó 0.57* 0.28 ó .047* 0.53 ó 0.68 
African Americans per CD 5.82 ó 5.69 5.72 ó 12.72** 6.68 ó 4.57* 
Evangelicals per CD 9.40 ó 10.25* 6.16 ó 8.41* 12.32 ó 11.76 
Jewish Americans per CD 1.19 ó 0.78* 2.66 ó 1.61§ 0.48 ó 0.33 
Arab Americans per CD 0.40 ó 0.37 0.42 ó 0.40 0.33 ó 0.34 
Muslim Americans per CD 0.30 ó 0.26 0.40 ó .047 0.24 ó 0.19 
Note: Numbers for contributions and constituency are in %.  
  
Table 3b – Independent Samples Tests for Campaign Contributions and Constituency Profiles 
– 2005 Vote (median) 
 Both Parties Democrats Republicans 
 Ayes – Nays Ayes- Nays Ayes – Nays 
DW Nominate .367 ó .132** -.438 ó -.385 .557 ó .411** 
NJ Foreign Policy conservatism 55 ó 48 16 ó 24 78 ó 73 
Agriculture contributions 0.41 ó 0.48 0.21 ó 0.41 0.59 ó 0.58 
Oil contributions 0.94 ó 0.62 0.28 ó 0.23 1.26 ó 1.28 
Israel contributions 0 ó 0 0.30 ó 0 0 ó 0 
Defense contributions 0.47 ó 0.56 0.10 ó 0.49* 0.92 ó 0.73 
African Americans 5.68 ó 5.86 5.83 ó 8.76 5.54 ó 4.84 
Evangelicals 12.33 ó 9.91 7.01 ó 7.49 16.43 ó 11.40 
Jewish Americans 0.73 ó 0.90 2.88 ó 1.88 0.28 ó 0.45 
Arab Americans 0.32 ó .039* 0.45 ó 0.42 0.25 ó 0.39** 
Muslim Americans 0.19 ó .028* 0.34 ó 0.54 0.12 ó 0.23§ 
Note: Numbers for contributions and constituency are in %. 
 
Table 3c – Independent Samples Tests for Campaign Contributions and Constituency Profiles 
– 2006 Vote (median) 
 Both Parties Democrats Republicans 
 Ayes – Nays Ayes- Nays Ayes – Nays 
DW Nominate -.358 ó .394** -.411 ó -.336* .412 ó .435 
NJ Foreign Policy conservatism 26 ó 71*** 20 ó 31*** 59 ó 73*** 
Agriculture contributions 0.34 ó 0.59** 0.37 ó 0.42 0.28 ó 0.59** 
Oil contributions 0.39 ó 1.00 *** 0.25 ó 0.23 1.53 ó 1.22 
Israel contributions 0 ó 0** 0.10 ó 0* 0 ó 0§ 
Defense contributions 0.41 ó 0.79** 0.37 ó 0.79§ 0.64 ó 0.76 
African Americans 7.31 ó 5.29* 9.10 ó 8.09 5.54 ó 5.01 
Evangelicals 7.85 ó 12.65** 6.40 ó 9.65** 11.15 ó 13.44 
Jewish Americans 1.67 ó 0.42** 2.46 ó 0.10** 0.78 ó 0.31 
Arab Americans 0.42 ó 0.35* 0.43 ó 0.36* 0.36 ó 0.34 
Muslim Americans 0.42 ó 0.22** 0.49 ó 0.32 0.23 ó 0.19 
Note: Numbers for contributions and constituency are in %. 
 
Table 3d – Independent Samples Tests for Campaign Contributions and Constituency Profiles 
– 2007 Vote (median) 
 Both Parties Democrats Republicans 
 Ayes – Nays Ayes – Nays Yes 
DW Nominate -.213 ó .424** -.361 ó -.430 .436 ó .478 
NJ Foreign Policy conservatism 44 ó 72*** 29 ó 25 72 ó 72 § 
Agriculture contributions 0.48 ó 0.76* 0.54 ó 0.53 0.42 ó 0.97* 
Oil contributions 0.50 ó 1.34*** 0.23 ó 0 1.20 ó 1.64 
Israel contributions 0 ó 0§ 0 ó 0§ 0 ó 0 
Defense contributions 0.53 ó 0.85* 0.43 ó 0.51 0.78 ó 1.07 
African Americans 5.80 ó 6.22 6.31 ó 20.53* 5.34 ó 5.31 
Evangelicals 9.75 ó 12.32** 7.85 ó 8.80 13.98 ó 13.32 
Jewish Americans 0.94 ó 0.41* 1.48 ó 1.87 0.40 ó 0.28 
Arab Americans 0.39 ó 0.35 0.42 ó 0.37 0.33 ó 0.35 
Muslim Americans 0.28 ó 0.26 0.33 ó 0.68§ 0.19 ó 0.20 
Note: Numbers for contributions and constituency are in %. 
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received only $100 million to $200 million in economic aid instead of the original $1 
billion had economic need been the only criterion taken into consideration. 
ii  Mann-Whitney tests confirmed that across the three Congressional sessions studied here, 
Democrats received significantly more contributions from the pro-Israel lobby relative to 
the overall amount of campaign contributions (Mean 0.08 versus 0.04%, both medians are 
at 0 due to the variable’s heavy skew), whereas Republicans received more contributions 
from the agriculture (Median 0.53 versus 0.42%), oil (1.27 versus 0.26%) and defense 
lobbies (0.78 versus 0.44%, all p <.001). In addition, Democrats represented more diverse 
districts with a higher share of African (Median 8.2% versus 5.0%), Jewish (1.7% versus 
0.38%), Arab (0.42% versus 0.33%) and Muslim Americans (0.43% versus 0.19%) and a 
lower share of Evangelical Christians (7.8% versus 12.8%, all p <.001). 
iii  The author would like Dustin Tingley for making the data available. 
iv  The author would like to thank Shane Martin for kindly granting access to data on the 
share of Muslim Americans per Congressional district. 
v  Due to their strong correlation (Kendell’s tau .454**), both variables were included in 
separate models. In order to conserve space, only models with the variable for Arab 
Americans per Congressional district are included in tables 4 through 7. 
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By covering a substantial amount of the costs of procuring new weapons systems, U.S. aid 
put the Egyptian military into a position where it could invest its resources into lucrative 
civilian business interests (Roston/Rohde 2011). 
viii Sterling Hights in Michigan’s 12th Congressional district is represented by Democrat 
Sander Levin. Gulfport in Mississippi’s 4th Congressional district was represented by 
Democrat Gene Taylor at the time of the votes. Orlando in Florida’s 8th Congressional 
district was represented by Republican Ric Keller. Stratford in Connecticut’s 3rd 
Congressional district is represented by Democrat Rosa DeLauro. Levin, Keller and 
DeLauro only began voting for conditioning or shifting aid to Egypt in 2006. Taylor voted 
against such proposals in all four cases.  
ix  In 2006, differences in the relative share of African-American and Muslim-American 
constituents as well as in oil contributions appear to be linked to the partisan nature of the 
roll call vote. The same applies to the 2007 vote in terms of differences in economic and 
foreign policy conservatism, defense and oil contributions as well as the share of 
Evangelical and Jewish-American constituents. 
x  Collinearity checks for all models showed that multi-collinearity had no major effect. All 
tolerance statistics were well above widely accepted thresholds.  
xi  There were no similar intra-group differences noticeable among either Evangelical or 
Jewish members of Congress across the four votes. 
xii  As a newly elected U.S. Senator, Roger Wicker helped blocked the aforementioned Senate 
Resolution 586 in 2010 (Rogin 2011b). 
xiii  In February 2011, Hosni Mubarak would promote Omar Suleiman to serve as his vice-
president in a failed effort to stem the tide of popular dissatisfaction with his regime. 
xiv  The exceptionally high standard error for the variable on Jewish faith is due to the fact that 
all 25 Jewish participants in the roll call vote supported the Obey amendment. The variable 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
remained in the model as a control for the impact of campaign contributions and 
constituency profile. 
